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ABSTRACT
The recent reform of the U.S. health care system has been described both as a boon and a death blow
for the healthcare industry and for private insurers in particular. We exploit the surprise election of
Republican Scott Brown to the U.S. Senate, which dealt a serious blow to the prospects for reform
by depriving Democrats of their 60-vote “filibuster-proof” majority, to evaluate the market's assessment
of Health Reform’s impact on the health care industry. We find that Scott Brown’s election was associated
with an abnormal return of 2.2 percent for a typical dollar invested in health care stocks and an abnormal
return of 6.3 percent for a typical dollar invested in managed care firms. A typical dollar invested in
the pharmaceutical sector experienced abnormal returns of 2.9 percent, while investments in healthcare
facilities (including hospitals) experienced abnormal losses of 3.4 percent. Analysis of firms participating
in government programs show that firms involved with Medicare Advantage experienced gains while
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“This is the insurance company’s dream, this bill”
1 
-- Howard Dean, former Chair, Democratic National 
Committee, December 16, 2009.  
 
“The health bill creates a massive cash crunch and then bankruptcies for 
many insurers.” 




“If Scott Brown wins, it will kill the health bill.” 
       --  Rep.  Barney  Frank,  January  15,  2010.
3 
 
“In a stunning blow to President Barack Obama, Republican Scott Brown 
won a bitter Senate race in Massachusetts on Tuesday and promised to be 
the deciding vote against his sweeping healthcare overhaul.” 
       --  Reuters,  January  20,  2010. 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
In March of 2010, Congress enacted and President Obama signed into law the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), which fundamentally altered the U.S. healthcare 
system. The legislation, which was championed by the President and Congressional Democrats, 
expands health insurance coverage to many of the 46 million uninsured people living in the 
United States through provisions aimed at increasing the number of people receiving health 
insurance from both government programs and private firms.  In particular, much of the bill is 
aimed at increasing participation in the private, non-group health insurance market.  The plan is 
neither the single-payer system advocated by the far left, nor the deregulated, free-market 
approach advocated by the far right.  As such, it has drawn energetic criticism from both sides. 
Critics on the left have assailed PPACA’s approach to expanding insurance as 
inadequate, preferring the creation of a public insurance option akin to Medicare to the plan’s 
individual mandate, which requires individuals to purchase (sometimes-subsidized) insurance 
                                                 
1 http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/HealthCare/howard-dean-health-care-bill-bigger-bailout-
insurance/story?id=9349392.  Such sentiments are not limited to the left.  According to former House majority 
leader Dick Armey (R, Texas), “Only the most blinkered of partisans can look at the "individual mandate" and not 
see it as the answer to the health insurance industry's prayers.”  See 
http://www.usnews.com/articles/opinion/2009/09/28/armey-individual-mandate-would-be-a-healthcare-industry-
boondoggle.html 
2 Richard A. Epstein, “Harry Reid Turns Insurance Into a Public Utility,” The Wall Street Journal, December 22, 
2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704304504574610040924143158.html. 
3 Montgomery, Lori.  “Democrats push for compromise on health bill,” The Washington Post, January 16, 2010: 
A04. 3 
from private firms.  They further argue that these measures, which come at a time of increasing 
premiums and record-high profits, amount to a bribe to the insurance industry.  Critics on the 
right, on the other hand, have responded to the provisions of the bill requiring insurers to cover 
even those with expensive, pre-existing conditions at the same rates charged to healthy people 
without a strong enough mandate requiring everyone to purchase insurance by noting that, under 
these conditions, healthy people will rationally decline to purchase insurance unless or until they 
become sick.  This, they argue, would make it impossible for private insurers to compete and 
quickly drive them out of business. 
As a more basic level, PPACA is an extremely complex piece of legislation with some 
provisions that can be expected to benefit healthcare firms and others that can be expected to 
harm them.
4  With regard to the insurance industry, the bill requires most U.S. citizens to have 
health insurance, either through purchasing private insurance or through a government program, 
or else pay a penalty.  Employers with more than 50 employees are required to contribute toward 
their employees’ health insurance or face a fine.  Health insurance exchanges will be created to 
help facilitate the purchase of health insurance, and poor people participating in the exchanges 
will receive subsidies.  These provisions, which increase the number of privately insured 
individuals in the country, might be expected to benefit insurers.  On the other hand, the law 
restricts insurers’ ability to place lifetime or annual limits on benefits, to rescind coverage and to 
charge premiums based on pre-existing conditions (including age).  The law also puts limits on 
the benefit designs that can be offered for sale on the health insurance exchanges including 
regulations requiring a minimum “medical loss ratio,” which require that upwards of 80 percent 
of premium dollars be spent on clinical services (as opposed to administration or profit).     
Finally, PPACA imposes additional taxes and fees on the insurance sector.   
PPACA also contains provisions that can be expected to benefit pharmaceutical firms and 
ones that can be expected to harm them.  On the beneficial side, PPACA substantially increases 
the number of people with health insurance and consequently with prescription drug coverage.  
On the other hand, the bill disallows reimbursement for over-the-counter drugs through tax-
advantaged flexible spending accounts and increased manufacturers’ drug rebates for Medicaid 
participants.  Perhaps most importantly, as part of a deal struck with pharmaceutical 
                                                 
4 See http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/housesenatebill_final.pdf for a summary of the major provisions of 
the House, Senate and final versions of Health Reform legislation. 4 
manufacturers, PPACA requires pharmaceutical manufacturers to provide $80 billion in savings 
over a decade, part of which would be used to fill the Medicare Part D “doughnut hole” between 
$2,000 and $6,154 in annual drug expenditures where seniors are currently required to pay 100% 
of the cost of their prescription drugs.
5  In exchange for this promise, the White House agreed 
not to pursue further limits on drug companies in Health Reform, including allowing the 
government to directly negotiate the prices of drugs purchased for Medicare participants. 
Ultimately, whether PPACA is expected to be, on net, positive or negative for healthcare 
firms, and for health insurance and pharmaceutical companies in particular, is an empirical one.  
Characterizing the sign and magnitude of these effects is the subject of this article.   
To identify the impact of PPACA on insurance company stocks, we exploit the surprise 
victory of Republican Scott Brown over Democrat Martha Coakley in the Massachusetts special 
election to replace the late Edward Kennedy (Democrat) in the Senate.  Brown’s victory, which 
deprived Democrats of their filibuster-proof majority in the Senate and consequently reduced the 
likelihood of a final bill being passed into law, was largely unanticipated until shortly before the 
election.  Thus, if Brown’s victory is associated with positive abnormal return to healthcare 
stocks, this suggests that markets interpreted Health Reform
6 as harmful to the healthcare 
industry, and vice-versa in the case of a negative abnormal return.
7 
Using a regression-based event-study approach, we find that Brown’s victory induced a 
positive and significant overall effect on healthcare stocks.
8  A typical dollar invested in the 
healthcare sector realized a 2.2 percent Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) between January 
14, 2010 and January 20, 2010.  Investments in pharmaceutical firms earned a CAR of 2.9 
percent, and investments in managed-care companies (i.e., health insurers) earned a CAR of 6.3 
percent.  Thus, the market appears to have judged Health Reform to be harmful to the healthcare 
industry overall and in particular to insurance and pharmaceutical firms.  However, not all firms 
experienced gains following the election.  In particular, we find that investments in healthcare 
                                                 
5 http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1915139,00.html 
6 In the fall of 2009, the House and Senate each passed health reform bills.  The bills were not identical, and, as 
such, any final bill would result from negotiations between the two houses.  Throughout the paper, we use the term 
“Health Reform” to refer to the merged bill that would ultimately be passed. 
7 We focus on the Brown election rather than the actual enactment of the bill because the election represented a 
significant shock to the likelihood of the bill’s passage.  In contrast, confidence in the bill’s passage grew slowly but 
steadily in the weeks leading up to its enactment.  Thus, it is likely that by the time the bill was actually signed, 
markets had already incorporated its impact into equity prices. 
8 One exception is in the facilities (hospitals) sub-sector, where we fine a negative effect, most likely due to the fact 
that Health Reform was widely expected to increase hospital utilization. 5 
facilities (e.g., hospitals) experienced abnormal losses of 3.4 percent following the election, 
consistent with the idea that Health Reform, which was expected to reduce the amount of 
uncompensated care hospitals were forced to provide, was good for the facilities subsector. 
The event study approach used in this paper, first introduced by Fama et al. (1969), has 
been used for over forty years to study the behavior of stock market prices around events such as 
earnings announcements and changes in regulatory, tax, fiscal or monetary policy.
9  Although the 
majority of these studies have focused on “economic” events, a number have considered, as does 
the present study, the impact of political events on equity prices.  Knight (2006) studies the 
Bush/Gore 2000 election and shows that, relative to what would have happened if Al Gore had 
won the race, “Bush-favored” firms enjoyed a 9 to 16 percent higher return under the Bush 
administration.
10  Other work on the 2000 election estimates that the delay in determining the 
results of the 2000 election resulted in lower returns on the U.S. (Nippani and Medlin, 2002) and 
Mexican and Canadian (Nippani and Arize, 2005) stock markets.  Ferri (2008) studies the 2004 
Bush/Kerry election and shows that Bush’s victory, which was unexpected when stock markets 
closed on election day, was associated with a positive movement in equity values.  Jayachandran 
(2006) studies Senator James Jeffords’ 2001 decision to leave the Republican party, shifting 
control of the U.S. Senate to the Democrats, and finds that firms that made donations to 
Republicans in the previous election cycle experienced negative returns following Jeffords’ 
switch, while Democratic donors experienced positive returns.  In related work, Den Hartog and 
Monroe (2008) show that the Jeffords switch was associated with negative returns for the oil and 
gas industries (which were favored under Republican policy) and positive abnormal returns for 
renewable energy stocks (which were favored under Democratic policy).  Friedman (2009) 
examines the impact of the passage of Medicare Part D on pharmaceutical firms’ profit using 
stock market returns and finds that Part D significantly increased the profit for makers of 
prescription drugs with high Medicare demand. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows.  Section II discusses the timeline of the 
Massachusetts Special Election and ex ante expectations for the impact of Health Reform on 
healthcare stocks.  Sections III presents the data and empirical strategy, and Section IV contains 
                                                 
9 See MacKinlay (1997) and Binder (1998) for general surveys of the uses of these methods and Khothari and 
Warner (2007) for a more in-depth summary of the econometrics of event studies. 
10 In addition to the results of the paper, Knight (2006) also provides an extensive review of the literature on event 
studies and political events. 6 
the basic results.  Section V discusses individual Managed Care firms, Section VI discusses 
robustness and extensions, and Section VII concludes. 
 
II.  Health Reform and the Massachusetts Special Election 
 
A. Background and Timeline 
In the summer and fall of 2009, the Democratic Party controlled the House of 
Representatives, the Senate and the White House.  Consequently, they set the country’s 
legislative agenda and the Health Reform proposals brought before Congress were written and 
supported almost exclusively by Democrats.  During this period, the Democratic caucus 
controlled 60 votes in the United States Senate, including 58 Democrats and Independents 
Bernard Sanders (VT) and Joseph Lieberman (CT).  Due to the Senate’s rules, 60 votes are 
required to end debate on a proposed bill and move to a vote.  And, in light of strong, across-the-
board Republican opposition to the proposals, without the support of 60 Senators it was highly 
unlikely that the Democrats would be able to bring proposed health care legislation to the floor 
for a vote. 
Senator Edward Kennedy (D., MA) died on August 25, 2009 after a sixteen month battle 
with brain cancer.
11  On September 24, 2009, Massachusetts governor Deval Patrick appointed 
former Kennedy aide Paul G. Kirk Jr., also a Democrat and supporter of Health Reform, to fill 
the seat that Kennedy had held for 47 years.  Kirk would serve until a special election to fill 
Kennedy’s seat was held on January 20, 2010.
12 
In the fall of 2009, the House of Representatives and Senate had each passed a health 
reform bill.  The House version of the bill (H.R. 3962, the “Affordable Health Care for America 
Act) passed 220-115, with support from 219 Democrats and one Republican.
13  Thirty-nine 
Democrats voted against the bill, in many cases because they thought the bill was not ambitious 
enough.  The Senate version of the bill (H.R. 3590, the “Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act”) passed 60 – 39 with one Senator not voting. Every Democrat (along with Independents 
Sanders and Lieberman) voted for the bill, while every Republican voted against the bill (with 
                                                 
11 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/27/us/politics/27kennedy.html 
12 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/25/us/politics/25massachusetts.html 
13 http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2009/roll887.xml 7 
the exception of Jim Bunning (KY), who did not vote).
14  Although broadly similar, there were 
significant differences in the bills.  The House version of the bill was somewhat more ambitious 
than the Senate version, including, in particular, a public health insurance option to be offered for 
sale to individuals on a national health insurance exchange.
15   
Given the disparate bills passed in the two houses of Congress, the standard legislative 
approach would involve a House-Senate conference committee developing a compromise bill 
that would then have to be passed again by each house.  In this case, the Senate Democrats 
would require every one of the 60 votes in their caucus to pass the bill, and consequently the 
contested Massachusetts Senate seat represented the critical, marginal vote that would allow 
Democrats to overcome Republican opposition and pass a compromise bill.  In the event that the 
Democrats did not maintain their 60 vote supermajority in the Senate, there were still routes to 
passage which, although somewhat obscure, had been spoken about by pundits and analysts for 
some time.  The first method involved the House passing the Senate’s version of the bill.  In this 
case, a second vote in the Senate would not be required.  The second involved using the “budget 
reconciliation” procedure that would allow some changes to be made to the original bills with 
only a simple majority of supporters in the Senate.
16  Thus, while a Republican victory in 
Massachusetts would be a serious setback for Health Reform and significantly decrease the 
likelihood of its passage, it would not necessarily kill the prospects for reform completely. 
The Democratic candidate in the Massachusetts special election was state Attorney 
General Martha Coakley, a supporter of Health Reform.
17  Her opponent was Massachusetts 
State Senator Scott Brown, who made opposition to Health Reform a centerpiece of his 
campaign.
18  Consequently, leading up to the special election, it was widely believed that a 
Coakley victory would likely lead to the passage of a compromise bill based on the House and 
Senate bills of 2009, while a Brown victory would make it extremely unlikely that such a 
compromise bill would be passed.  Thus, the Massachusetts special election, falling between 
passage of the bills in the House and Senate and reconsideration of a combined bill, became a 
critical test for Health Reform as envisioned by President Obama and the Democrats in 2009.   
                                                 
14 http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&session=1&vote=00396 
15 For a comparison of the bills, see http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/housesenatebill_final.pdf. 
16 Ultimately, Health Reform was passed using a combination of the House passing the Senate version of the bill and 
a reconciliation bill.  However, the issue for the validity of this study is not whether Scott Brown’s election made 
passage of the bill impossible, but whether it reduced the likelihood of passage.  We discuss this point below. 
17 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/09/us/politics/09mass.html 
18 http://www.brownforussenate.com/issues. 8 
Immediately following the primary elections to select candidates to vie for Kennedy’s 
seat, Martha Coakley was considered a strong favorite.  Massachusetts is a strongly Democratic 
state, having supported the Democratic candidate for President in each of the last six elections.  
Prior to Brown’s election, Massachusetts’s ten Representatives to the House of Representatives 
and both Senators were Democrats.  Massachusetts’s last Republican Representatives left office 
in 1997, and the last Republican Senator left office in 1979.  As mentioned earlier, Kennedy had 
held the seat in question for 47 years. 
Early polling placed Coakley well ahead of Brown.  A Suffolk University/7News poll 
conducted in November, before the parties had chosen their candidates, put Coakley ahead of 
Brown in a hypothetical race by a 31 point margin, 58% to 27%.  This perceived lead persisted 
into 2010, with a January 10
th Boston Globe story showing Coakley up by 15 – 17 points. 
The race between Brown and Coakley began to tighten around the second week of 
January, when a group of polls emerged that showed Brown and Coakley in a statistical dead 
heat.
19  Then, around January 15, several polls emerged showing Brown had taken a 10-15 point 
lead over Coakley.  On Friday, January 15
th, President Obama announced that he would travel to 
Massachusetts to campaign for Coakley on Sunday, January 17
th.
20 
In the January 19
th  election, Brown defeated Coakley 51.9 percent to 47.1 percent.  The 
Boston Globe described the Brown victory as “one of the biggest upsets in Massachusetts 
political history,” saying “the stunning, come-from-behind victory caps a dramatic surge in 
recent days as Brown … roared ahead of Coakley.”
21 
The dramatic shift in the race, from polls showing a 15 point lead for Coakley to showing 
a similarly-sized lead for Brown, culminating in Brown’s 5 point victory, can be attributed to 
several factors.  First, due to the Democrats’ strength in Massachusetts, Coakley and her staff 
underestimated Brown’s ability to mount a serious challenge.  Consequently, Coakely adopted 
the role of “aloof front runner” in the race, eschewing personal appearances and even going so 
far as to go on vacation over the holidays, with fewer than 20 days left before the election.
22  As 
a result, Coakley lacked a strong image in voters’ minds, and this left her vulnerable to several 
                                                 




http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/15/AR2010011504069.html.  See also 
http://www.boston.com/news/local/breaking_news/2010/01/coakley_underes.html for an in depth discussion of how 
and why Coakley’s team underestimated Brown. 9 
missteps she made late in the campaign, most notably referring in a January 15
th radio interview 
to Boston Red Sox hero Curt Schilling as a fan of the New York Yankees. This led Schilling, a 
Brown supporter, to begin a series of media interviews and robo-calls in which he questioned 
Coakley’s ability to represent the people of Massachusetts. 
The Republicans, on the other hand, took advantage of the Democrats’ complacency.  
Although early internal polling found the race between Brown and Coakley to be much closer 
than widely believed, the Republicans did not widely disseminate these results.  Instead, Scott 
Brown took to the streets in a series of public appearances, and it turned out that he was a 
surprisingly effective “retail campaigner.” 
The press was also slow to pick up on the changing tides in the Massachusetts election.  
After running initial stories on how Coakley was expected to win the election, the major 
newspapers did not catch onto changing sentiment in Massachusetts until late in the race.  The 
New York Times, The Washington Post and The Los Angeles Times did not run stories suggesting 
the Massachusetts race might be closer than expected until Jan. 8, 11 and 14, respectively.  Even 
the Boston Globe did not make a major shift in its coverage of the race until Jan. 15, when it 
noted that Democrats were panicking about the neck-and-neck campaign. Television news was 
even slower to report the story, with ABC News first reporting on the closeness of the race on 
Jan. 15 and CBS and NBC news not reporting on this until Jan. 17, once President Obama had 
gone to Massachusetts to campaign for Coakley.
 23  
Another factor contributing to the rapid movement in the polls and Brown’s surprise 
victory was the unusual nature of the election.  If not the first of its kind, statewide special 
elections of this sort are certainly unusual.  Given the lack of a history of similar elections to 
draw on, polling data in special elections is extraordinarily noisy, as are the results of the 
elections, which are highly sensitive to which potential voters decide to go to the polls in an off-
cycle election, in this case one taking place in January in Massachusetts. 
In addition to the inherent uncertainty surrounding the election, differences in polling 
methods also played a role in the Democrats and the media failing to take notice of the 
narrowing race.  The polls that showed the greatest lead for Coakley were those that included the 
widest number of potential voters, while polls that focused on likely voters showed a much 
                                                 
23 See Howard Kurtz in The Washington Post for a comprehensive discussion of the media “Missing the Mark in 
Massachusetts,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/25/AR2010012500741.html. 10 
narrower race.   Because of this, the turnout model used to convert the raw data to projections 
about behavior in the election is crucial, and in this case there was little guidance on what the 
right model was.  For example, the polls that showed the narrowest gap between the candidates 
used automated “robo-callers” to survey likely voters, a method that is often dismissed as flawed.  
However, given that those who are willing to respond to automated polls are likely to be highly 
motivated to vote, in this case the automated polls may have been more accurate than those 
conducted by human interviewers. 
Nevertheless, even as public polls began to show the race narrowing, the Democrats 
tended to interpret the results in light of their perceived advantage, dismissing them as flawed.  
For example, in one debate Coakley dismissed questions about polls showing the race as 
narrowing saying only “I think everyone will see where we are on Jan. 19.”
 24   
For these reasons and more, Scott Brown’s surprise victory in Massachusetts provided an 
unforeseen shock to the likelihood of Health Reform being passed into law.  As long as Brown’s 
victory was not fully anticipated by equity markets, this event can be used to study the impact of 
a decrease in the likelihood of health reform on equity prices and thus whether Health Reform 
was expected to be a “dream” or a “nightmare” for health insurers and other health care firms. 
Evidence on the surprise embodied in the Brown victory is provided by the prediction 
market Intrade.com, which offered contracts on the likelihood of a Brown or Coakley victory.
25  
The Intrade.com contract on a Brown or Coakley victory paid $100 if the named candidate and 
$0 otherwise.  Thus, the contract price (divided by 100) can be interpreted as the market’s view 
of the likelihood of the named candidate winning the election.  Figure 1 depicts the daily closing 
prices of the Intrade.com contracts on victory for Brown and Coakley.  Due to the presence of a 
third candidate, Joseph Kennedy (no relation to the deceased Senator), the numbers need not sum 
to 100.  Through January 9, the victory probabilities stood steady at around 90% for Coakley and 
10% for Brown.  Over the next week, the contracts moved around somewhat, inching toward 
70/30 in favor of Coakley at the January 15
th close.
 26  Over the weekend, however, the contracts 
                                                 
24 http://www.politico.com/blogs/scorecard/0110/Coakley_Brown_square_off_in_testy_debate.html 
25Snowberg, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2008) suggest directly using the intrade.com prices as independent variables 
rather than the occurrence of a particular event.  We do not adopt this here due to the fact that the Brown and 
Coakely markets were relatively thinly traded and, while a Brown victory would presumably move the market’s 
assessment of the likelihood of Health Reform being enacted, it is not a direct measure of this assessment.  Since the 
election represents a clean event, we instead adopt the simpler event-study approach. 
26 Interestingly, Brown’s January 10
th bump coincided with the Boston Globe’s publication of its poll showing 
Coakley held a 15 point lead in the polls.  However, the same article suggested that there were some “glimmers of 11 
reversed, closing at 77 for Brown and 25 for Coakley on January 18 before Brown’s eventual 
victory the next day.  Thus, much of the movement in expectations regarding the likelihood of a 
Brown victory occurred between the end of trading on January 15 and election day.   
Conveniently for the sake of this study, the markets were closed on Monday, January 18, in 
observance of the Martin Luthar King holiday.  Thus, while new information accumulated over 
the weekend, markets were unable to incorporate this information between the close of trading 
on January 15 and the opening on election day, January 19. 
 In light of this, it does appear that Brown’s victory came as a surprise to the markets and, 
as such, can be used to gauge the impact of the decline in the likelihood of health reform being 
passed on health care industry stocks. Unfortunately, there was no Intrade contract for Health 
Reform at the time of the Brown-Coakley election, so it cannot be used to directly test the 
relationship between the election and the likelihood of Health Reform’s passage or between 
Health Reform and stock prices. 
 
B.  Empirical Hypotheses 
As discussed in the introduction, in the case of health insurers and pharmaceutical firms, 
Health Reform contained both beneficial and harmful provisions.  Consequently, the expected 
impact of Health Reform on these sub-industries is ambiguous.  Determining the signs of these 
effects is one of the major purposes of this article. 
However, while the ex ante impact on insurance and pharmaceutical sub-industries was 
ambiguous, Health Reform was expected to have an unambiguous effect on a number of other 
parts of the healthcare industry, including hospitals, medical device manufacturers and 
participants in government programs such as Medicare Advantage and Medicaid Managed Care. 
Regarding hospitals, over its first decade Health Reform is expected to substantially 
reduce the number of uninsured people in the country, which would benefit hospitals in two 
ways.  First, insured consumers tend to use (and pay for) substantially more health care than 
uninsured ones, including hospital services.  Second, the movement of so many people from the 
ranks of the uninsured to the insured is expected to radically reduce the amount of charity care 
that hospitals will have to provide.
   Hospitals are required to care for patients who present 
                                                                                                                                                             
hope for the Republican,” possibly leading Intrade.com traders to revise their beliefs about the possibility of Brown 
winning the election.  http://www.boston.com/news/politics/2008/articles/2010/01/10/senate_poll_coakley_up_15_points/ 
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themselves at the Emergency Department, whether the patient can pay or not.  As such, they are 
forced to care for patients who will not or cannot pay for the care they receive.  This unpaid or 
“charity” care is estimated to have cost hospitals $36 billion in 2008.  Health Reform, by 
insuring many of these patients, is expected to significantly reduce hospitals’ unpaid care (as 
well as increase utilization by those with insurance).  As such, we expect that health reform will 
benefit hospitals and therefore that Brown’s election (corresponding to a decrease in the 
likelihood of Health Reform being passed) will have a negative effect on hospitals’ stock 
prices.
27 
Health Reform was also expected to have an unambiguous impact on medical device 
manufacturers.  Both the House and Senate versions of Health Reform imposed new taxes and/or 
fees on medical devices, with the Senate bill imposing fees of $2 billion, growing to $3 billion in 
2017, and the House bill imposing a 2.5% tax on the first sale of medical devices.
28  Since Health 
Reform harms device manufacturers, we expect Brown’s election to be associated with a positive 
return to device manufacturers.   
Finally, although Health Reform was expected to have an ambiguous impact on health 
insurers overall, the impact on participation in various government programs was not.  Health 
Reform significantly scaled back the payments made to firms caring for patients in the Medicare 
Advantage (Medicare Part C) program.  Thus we might expect firms that receive a larger share 
of their business from this program to benefit (relatively) less from Health Reform.  On the other 
hand, Health Reform increased eligibility for Medicaid, which was expected to benefit firms 
providing care to these new enrollees through Medicaid Managed Care plans.
29  Thus we expect 
that insurers with a greater share of their business from Medicaid Managed Care will benefit 
more from Health Reform.  In terms of the election, we expect Scott Brown’s election to be 
better for firms with greater Medicare Advantage involvement, and to be worse for firms with 
greater Medicaid Managed Care involvement.  
 
 
                                                 
27 See Abelson, Reed, “Bills Stalled, Hospitals Fear Rising Unpaid Care,” The New York Times¸Feb. 8, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/09/health/policy/09hospital.html, accessed June 22, 2010. 
28 See http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/housesenatebill_final.pdf. 
29 In particular, Health Reform was expected to add about 16 million to the ranks of Medicare, with the federal 
government initially providing 100 percent funding for newly-eligible beneficiaries, most of whom would receive 
care through private managed care plans.  Health Reform also increased Medicaid reimbursements.   
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8139.pdf 13 
III.  Data and Empirical Strategy 
We analyze the impact of Scott Brown’s election on firms in the health care industry 
using total return data on 3674 firms from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
database.  This represents all firms traded on the NYSE and NASDAQ exchanges that are part of 
the S&P Total Market Index (SPTMI) with total return data available during the study period.  
The SPTMI seeks to represent the entire universe of U.S. equities.  In order to study the impact 
of the election on the healthcare industry, we classify a firm as belonging to the healthcare 
industry based on its S&P Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) code.   In particular, 
we classify a firm as belonging to the healthcare industry if its two digit GICS code is 35.  The 
GICS codes are acquired from COMPUSTAT and cross-matched to the returns data based on 
their Committee on Uniform Security Procedures (CUSIP) codes.     
We begin our analysis of the anticipated impact of Health Reform on the broad health 
care industry by estimating the impact of Scott Brown’s election on all publicly traded healthcare 
firms in the CRSP database.  In order to get a sense of whether the impact of Brown’s election on 
major industry players differed from the impact on smaller ones, we further subdivide firms 
based on whether they are constituents of one of four S&P Industry Select Portfolios (SPISP): 
Health Care Equipment, Health Care Services, Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology.  Using 
SPISP healthcare firms is a more inclusive definition of what it means to be a “major” healthcare 
firm than using healthcare firms in the S&P 500 index.  Using the latter definition changes the 
results only slightly.
30 
In order to get a more detailed view of the election’s impact, we next classify the firms 
into each of the ten healthcare sub-industries contained in the SPISP based on the S&P Global 
Industry Classification Standard (GICS) classification, namely: Health Care (HC) Distributors, 
HC Equipment, HC Facilities, HC Services, HC Supplies, HC Technology, Biotechnology, Life 
Sciences Tools and Services, Managed HC, and Pharmaceuticals.
31  Health insurers are included 
in the Managed Healthcare subsector, hospitals are included in the Facilities subsector, and 
medical device manufacturers are classified in the Equipment subsector. 
                                                 
30 As our results tend to be concentrated in major firms, we find a slightly larger average impact on healthcare firms 
in the S&P 500 than we do on SPISP healthcare firms. 
31 Similar results hold for sector definitions based on North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) 
codes. 14 
To analyze the impact of Scott Brown’s election on firms in the healthcare sector, we 
adopt a regression-based event-study approach to estimate the change in return of these 
companies operating in the health industry as a result of the surprising election of Scott Brown. 
The method is, in principle, quite simple.  We treat Brown’s election as an exogenous shock to 
the likelihood of health reform being passed, and thus any abnormal returns to health care 
equities beyond what can be accounted for by movements in the overall market and other known 
risk factors following the election can be attributed to the impact of the election. 
In order to allow for the fact that the likelihood of Brown’s victory may have been 
incorporated into stock prices in the days before the election and/or may not have been fully 
incorporated on election day (since the polls did not close until after the market did), we consider 
an event window beginning two trading days before the election day and ending one day after it.  
Thus the four trading days in the event window range from Thursday, January 14
th to 
Wednesday, January 20
th (inclusive). Our choice of the start date of the event window is 
motivated (as per Snowberg, Wolfers, and Zitzewitz (2008)) by referring to the Intrade 
prediction market. As Figure 1 shows, the odds of Scott Brown winning the elections started to 
increase dramatically on January 14, 2010. Although a case could be made for starting the event 
window slightly earlier, one of the managed care firms we study, Aetna, announced in its 8-K 
quarterly earnings filing on January 12
th that it expected lower earnings in 2010 than 2009. 
Hence, we start our event window on January 14
th in order to allow markets to fully incorporate 
this news and avoid contaminating our study. 
The basic strategy of the analysis involves comparing firms’ actual returns during the 
event window with what their return should be based on a 1000 trading-day estimation window.  
To be as inclusive as possible, we include all firms for which returns were observed on at least 
50 days in the estimation window.  The results are substantially unchanged if we restrict the 
sample to only those firms whose returns are observed for all 1000 days in the estimation period 
or to only those firms in the S&P 500. 
We begin our analysis by estimating a Fama-French three-factor model for the 1000 
trading days preceding the event window for each firm in the CRSP database (whether or not the 
firm is a healthcare firm).  The Fama-French model (Fama and French, 1992; 1993) predicts the 
firm’s return on any given day based on the relationship between the firm’s return and the return 
on the market portfolio and two other risk factors that have been shown to influence equity 15 
returns, the difference between the return on stocks with small and large market capitalization 
(the “small minus big” or SMB factor) and the difference between the return on stocks with high 
and low book-to-market value (the “high-minus-low” or HML factor). The estimation equation 
takes the form: 
 it ft i i mt ft si t hi t it RR R R S M B H M L             Eq. (1)
where  it R is the daily total return rate of firm (i) on day (t), Rmt is the total return to the CRSP 
market portfolio, Rft  is the risk free interest rate at time t, SMBt is the Fama-French “small minus 
big” factor at time t, and HMLt is the Fama-French “high minus low book-to-market” factor at 
time t and  it   is the error term for company i during period t .  SMB captures the historic excess 
return of diversified portfolios of small market capitalization stocks over portfolios of large ones, 
while HML captures the historic excess return of high book-to-market stocks over low ones. 
The estimated parameters from applying ordinary least squares to Eq. (1) for each firm 
can be used to predict the firm’s expected return during each of the event days as: 
 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ it ft i i mt ft si t hi t R RR R S M B H M L         . The impact of Brown’s election on 
healthcare companies is assessed using the firms’ Abnormal Return (AR), which measures the 
difference between actual returns for these equities during the event window and their predicted 
returns. Hence, the (AR) of company (i) on day (t) is equal to; 
      ˆˆ ˆ ˆ it it ft i i mt ft si t hi t ARR R R R S M B H M L            Eq. (2)
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In the analysis, we examine the results of regressions of the form: 
JK
ii j j i k k i i
jk
CAR D x u         Eq. (4)
where Dij are a series of sector- or sub-sector-level dummy variables (e.g., whether the firm is a 
health care firm),  xik are (potentially) a series of individual-level controls and ui is a firm-
specific error term, assumed to have zero mean conditional on the dependent variables.    Thus, 16 
our estimation strategy compares the CAR during the event window for firms in the healthcare 
sector to those outside of the healthcare sector.
32 
The regression in Eq. (4) takes the firm as the unit of observation.  Thus, regression 
coefficients tell us the impact on a randomly chosen firm of Scott Brown’s election due to the 
covariate.  While this question is of interest, it treats small and large firms equally.  Given that 
the market for small-firm stocks tend to be less liquid and consequently noisier, this may result 
in small firms exerting undue influence over the regression results.  To address this, in addition 
to equally weighted regressions, we also run regressions that are weighted by firms’ market 
capitalization.  The market-capitalization-weighted regressions have the additional benefit that 
the coefficients are interpretable as the impact of Brown’s election on an average dollar invested 
in the stock market, rather than the impact on an average firm. 
If equity markets are efficient, then they will incorporate new information into prices 
relatively quickly.  Taking this as given, the assumptions necessary for regression coefficients to 
identify the impact of Brown’s election on healthcare stocks are that (i) the outcome of the 
election came as a surprise and so its impact was not incorporated into stock prices before the 
election took place, (ii) that no other events occurred during the event window that might affect 
firms’ abnormal returns, and (iii) that Scott Brown’s election did not affect the likelihood of 
other policy changes along dimensions that cannot be controlled for in our analysis.
33  A final 
critical assumption is (iv), that Scott Brown’s election actually decreased the market’s perceived 
likelihood of Health Reform’s passage, rather than increasing it.  We begin by discussing the 
first two assumptions here.  The final two, which are critical for interpreting the results, are taken 
up in Section V. 
We argued that Brown’s victory was, in fact, a surprise in the previous section, and our 
choice of the four-day event window was driven by the need to exclude the possibility of other 
events contaminating the event window.  To further address the question of whether there were 
other events related to the healthcare industry that took place during the event window and might 
contaminate it, we reviewed the First Call Historical database, the NewsBank World News 
                                                 
32 A different approach would compare firms’ behavior during the event window to behavior during the estimation 
window, using time-series variation rather than cross-sectional variation to identify the impact of Brown’s election.  
Although we adopt the cross-sectional approach to facilitate consideration in Section VI of whether observed 
changes during the event window might have been caused by changes in policies other than Health Reform, the 
basic results using the time series approach are quite similar. 
33 Examples of other policies that might have been affected by Brown’s election include labor reform legislation, 
dividend tax reform legislation, and financial sector reform. 17 
service, and Lexus/Nexus Academic for relevant news stories concerning health care firms in the 
SPISP during the event period, searching for each by name and stock ticker.  Although some 
firms received idiosyncratic news during the event period, the news was not systematically good 
or bad, and such events there were (e.g., court rulings, recalls) were rare and unlikely to have 
broad effects at the industry or sub-industry level.
34  The major exception is Aetna’s “negative-
surprise” earnings announcement on January 12
th discussed above, which could be interpreted as 
bad news for the industry in general and led us to choose January 14
th as the start of the 
estimation window. 
     
IV.  Basic Results 
Tables 1 and 1a present the results of the analysis for all health care firms, for firms 
decomposed into whether or not they are constituents of the SPISP, and for firms decomposed 
into healthcare subsectors.
35  The dependent variable in Tables 1 and 1a is a firm’s CAR over the 
four day event window.  Columns 1 – 3 of Table 1 present equally weighted regressions, so that 
coefficients should be interpreted as the impact on a typical firm. Robust standard errors are used 
throughout the paper. 
Column 1 regresses firm-level CARs on an indicator for whether the firm is in the 
healthcare sector (i.e., two-digit GICS code 35).  We find that a typical firm experienced an 
abnormal return of approximately 6 tenths of a percent, statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level (p = 0.07).  Column 2 splits the regression by whether the healthcare firm is also in the 
SPISP and reveals that the positive abnormal return is concentrated among healthcare firms in 
the SPISP, where we find a CAR of 1.33 percent (p<0.01).  Figure 2 shows cumulative abnormal 
returns for all healthcare firms, for SPISP healthcare firms and for non-SPISP healthcare firms 
over the four event days. 
Column 3 of Table 1 splits the healthcare industry into 10 subsectors, revealing a 
positive, statistically significant CAR of 2.85 percent in the Managed Care sector.  This 
                                                 
34 Events affecting only a single firm are captured by the idiosyncratic shock to firms’ abnormal returns and will not 
bias the estimates of the impact of the election. 
35 During the event window, several prominent firms in the financial sector issued earnings announcements.   
Consequently we include a dummy variable for whether the firm is in the financial sector in all regressions.  The 
results do not change substantially if financial firms are dropped from the regressions entirely, as is common 
practice in the finance literature (e.g., Fama and French, 1992).  Not including the dummy variable reduces 
statistical significance in some cases, but the main effects remain highly statistically significant (particularly in the 
value-weighted regressions). 18 
represents our first evidence that Scott Brown’s election benefitted health insurance companies, 
i.e., that markets perceived Health Reform as being harmful to health insurers. 
Column 1 of Table 1a, which presents an equally-weighted regression further splitting the 
subsectors according to whether firms are in the SPISP, reveals a number of additional 
interesting nuances to the results.  Again, statistically significant results are concentrated in 
healthcare firms that are also in the SPISP.  We find a strong, positive effect on SPISP firms in 
the Managed care sub-sector, where a typical firm experienced a CAR of 7 percent during the 
event window.  SPISP Pharmaceutical firms also experienced significant gains, with a CAR of 
3.3 percent.  Thus, Brown’s election appears to have been beneficial for healthcare stocks as a 
whole as well as the Managed care and Pharmaceutical sectors. 
Column 1 of Table 1a also finds a CAR of negative 3.1 percent in the SPISP Facilities 
sector, which includes hospitals.  This result confirms the expectation discussed above that 
Health Reform, by increasing utilization and reducing charity care, would benefit hospitals. 
Tables 1 and 1a also reveal positive CARs of 1.5 to 2 percent for the healthcare 
Equipment sector, depending on the specification.  Interestingly, this positive CAR is statistically 
significant even for the non-SPISP firms.  Again, this result agrees with ex ante expectations for 
the subsector due to the taxes and fees Health Reform imposed on medical device manufacturers.  
Figure 3 depicts CARs by event day for the SPISP Equipment, Facilities, Managed Care and 
Pharma sectors. 
The lack of significant findings for firms outside the SPISP may be due to any of several 
factors.  The first is that the firms in the SPISP are the major firms in the market.  Firms outside 
of the SPISP may be lesser-known and somewhat thinly traded, the result being that it takes 
longer for shocks to translate into price movements for these stocks.  In addition, as noted above, 
there is expected to be heterogeneity in the impact of Brown’s election across healthcare 
subsectors, and inspection reveals there seems to be more noise in firms’ classification outside of 
the SPISP than there is inside.  If this is the case, that would tend to reduce the likelihood of 
finding a statistically significant impact (in either direction) of the election on these stocks. 
Columns 4 – 6 of Table 1 and Column 2 of Table 1a present the results for market-
capitalization weighted regressions, which aid in interpretation of the results for two reasons.  
First, since we have found different effects depending on whether the firm is in the SPISP, which 
is generally correlated with size, weighting regressions by market-capitalization incorporates 19 
these differences.  Second, the coefficients on the weighted regressions have a straightforward 
interpretation.  They represent the impact of Brown’s election on a typical dollar invested in the 
stock market. 
The results here are broadly consistent with those of the equally-weighted regressions, 
although the effects tend to be larger in magnitude due to the fact that the effects tend to be 
concentrated in firms in the SPISP and these firms, which tend to be larger, are given greater 
influence in the weighted regressions.  We find that a typical dollar invested in the healthcare 
sector experienced a CAR of about 2.15 percent, with investments in the managed-care and 
pharmaceutical subsectors experiencing CARs of 6.3 and 2.9 percent, respectively.  A typical 
dollar invested in the equipment subsector had a CAR of 1.9 percent, while one invested in the 
facilities subsector experienced a CAR of negative 3.37 percent.  Figures 4 and 5 adapt Figures 2 
and 3, showing CARs over the event window for all healthcare firms, SPISP healthcare firms, 
and non-SPISP healthcare firms as well as selected industry subsectors using market-
capitalization weighted averages. 
Before continuing the analysis, a comment on interpreting the magnitude of the effects is 
in order.  While we find an overall CAR of 2.15 percent associated with Brown’s election, this is 
not the same as saying that Health Reform was expected to decrease the market value of 
investments in the healthcare sector by 2.15 percent.  This would only be an appropriate 
conclusion if the probability of reform were one before the election and zero after.
36  Otherwise, 
the estimate must be scaled by the change in the probability of reform and our results represent 
lower bounds on the magnitude of the effect of Health Reform on healthcare firms.  Thus, if the 
election decreased the probability of reform from 0.8 to 0.2, the appropriate back-of-the-
envelope computation would be that reform was expected to decrease the value of the firms in 
our sample by 2.15/(0.8-0.2) = 3.58 percent.  These concerns do not, however, affect the 
interpretation of the signs of the effect.  Thus, a positive abnormal return associated with the 
election corresponds to Health Reform being expected to harm firm interests as long as Brown’s 
election decreases the probability of reform.  We turn to this and other issues in interpreting the 
results in the Section VI. 
 
                                                 
36 As discussed below, it also requires that the election affected only the likelihood of Health Reform passing, not 
the nature of the bill that the markets expected to be passed. 20 
 
V. Detailed Analysis for Managed Care 
 
A.  Results for Individual Managed Care Firms 
One of the main goals of Health Reform is to expand insurance coverage by reforming 
insurance markets.  Due to the importance of the insurance industry for both the political debate 
and real impact of Health Reform, in this section we investigate the firms in the managed care 
segment in more detail, focusing on those firms in the SPISP, which include all of the major 
commercial insurers. 
The firms in the SPISP Managed Care segment are Aetna, CIGNA, Coventry Health 
Care, Humana, Unitedhealth and WellPoint. These firms are also constituents of the S&P 500, 
suggesting that not only are they important within healthcare, but that they are major firms even 
when compared to the overall market.  To evaluate the size of the election’s impact on these 
firms, rather than rely on regressions with so few observations we instead employ on a simple, 
nonparametric test, comparing the CAR for each firm in the segment with the distribution of 
CARs for firms in the S&P 500 outside of the healthcare and financial sectors.
37  The CAR for a 
firm is unusually large if it appears in the right-tail of this distribution. 
Table 2 reports the CAR for each firm and the probability that a randomly chosen CAR 
from the set of S&P 500 firms in neither the health nor the financial sectors is greater or equal to 
the firm’s CAR.  Each of the Managed Care firms reports a positive CAR, ranging from 4.8 
percent for Wellpoint to 9.7 percent for Humana.  The probability of a randomly drawn CAR 
being larger than Wellpoint’s is approximately 4 percent, while the probability for Human is less 
than 1 percent.  Thus, in all cases, the CARs for major health insurance companies are unusually 
large relative to those of other firms in the S&P 500.  We thus conclude that not only did the 
election benefit Managed Care firms on average, but also did so for each major firm individually.  
Figure 5 plots the CARs for these individual firms over the four day event window. 
 
B.  Relationship Between CARs and Involvement in Government Healthcare Programs 
Next, we consider the extent to which individual insurers’ CARs varied depending on the 
firms’ involvement in government healthcare programs.  As discussed above, Health Reform 
                                                 
37 We exclude financial sector firms due to the earnings announcements during the event window discussed above. 21 
reduced reimbursements for health insurers participating in the Medicare Advantage program 
and increased eligibility for Medicaid, which was expected to benefit firms providing care to 
these new enrollees through Medicaid managed care plans, which stood to benefit greatly from 
reform.
38  Consequently, we expect to observe firms that are more reliant on the Medicare 
Advantage program to experience larger CARs and firms that are more reliant on the Medicaid 
program to experience smaller ones. 
  As a first test of these hypotheses, we classified firms as serving “Medicare Advantage,” 
or “Medicaid” or “Medicaid Managed Care” based on a search for each of these terms in the firm 
descriptions on Google finance.
39  Note that, due to the method, all firms classified as 
participating in Medicaid Managed Care are also classified as participating in Medicaid.   
Although somewhat crude, reading the descriptions verified that the method, for the most part, 
succeeded in identifying firms involved with each of these programs. We then regressed firm-
level CARs on dummy variables for whether the firm’s description contained Medicare 
Advantage, Medicaid or Medicaid managed care. 
Results are presented in Table 3.  The first column includes the dummy variables for 
Medicare Advantage and Medicaid Managed Care only, and we find a strong positive effect for 
firms participating in Medicare Advantage and a negative effect on firms involved with 
Medicaid managed care.  The second column adds the Medicaid dummy variable.  Here we find 
that the effect on Medicare Advantage is positive and the effect on Medicaid overall is negative 
but not statistically significant.  In this specification, the appropriate test for whether there is an 
impact on firms participating in Medicare Managed Care is the F-test for the null hypothesis that 
the sum of coefficients on Medicaid and Medicaid Managed Care is zero.  The results show that 
this hypothesis can be rejected at the 5 percent level of significance. 
  As a second test of this hypothesis, for each of the firms in the Managed Care subsector 
we gathered data from the firm’s 2009 annual reports and/or 10k filings on the number of 
members in their Medicare Advantage, Medicaid and commercial insurance segments (measured 
                                                 
38 In particular, Health Reform was expected to add about 16 million to the ranks of Medicare, with the federal 
government initially providing 100 percent funding for newly-eligible beneficiaries, most of whom would receive 
care through private managed care plans.  Health Reform also increased Medicaid reimbursements.  
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8139.pdf 
39 Similar results hold using definitions based on lists of top firms serving Medicare Advantage (Kaiser Family 
Foundation) and Medicaid Managed Care (USAToday). 22 
in thousands) and the amount of revenue received (measured in millions of dollars) from each of 
these sources.
40 
Table 4 presents results of regressions of firms’ CARs on these variables.  Columns 1 and 
2 demonstrate a positive relationship between a firm’s Medicare Advantage membership and its 
CAR, and a negative relationship between Medicaid membership and CAR, once again 
confirming ex ante expectations that Health Reform would benefit firms with significant 
Medicare Advantage business less and benefit with significant Medicaid business more. The 
inclusion in column 2 of a dummy variable for whether the firm is in the SPISP changes the 
results only slightly, ruling out the possibility that the observed effects arise due to Medicare 
Advantage or Medicaid involvement serving as a proxy for being in the SPISP, which we know 
to be positively related to CAR.  Columns 3 and 4 show results for regressions of CAR on 
revenue from the various sectors and demonstrate a similar pattern. 
In addition to confirming our ex ante expectations regarding the relationship between 
Health Reform and participation in Medicare Advantage and Medicaid Managed Care, the 
results of Table 4 also demonstrate that not only do equity markets react to political events, but 
that they do so in a rather sophisticated way.  Even among health insurers, we find that market 
returns reflect the firms’ heterogeneity with respect to participation in these two programs. 
 
VI.  Robustness and Issues in Interpretation 
  As discussed above, the interpretation of our results as saying that markets viewed Health 
Reform as being harmful to the healthcare sector overall and to health insurance companies in 
particular depends on a number of assumptions.  In this section we consider two of the 
assumptions that have not yet been addressed: that Brown’s election actually decreased the 
likelihood of Health Reform being enacted, and that Brown’s election did not affect the extent or 
likelihood of other policy changes along dimensions that have not been or cannot be controlled 
for.  As part of the first point, we also discuss the possibility that the chief effect of Brown’s 
election may not have been on the likelihood of reform, but rather on the expected nature of 
reform. 
                                                 
40 Of the 17 firms in the Managed Care subsector, one America Services Group (ASGR) provides healthcare 
services to prisons.  Magellan Health Services (MGLN), provided revenue data but not enrollment data, while 
UnitedHealth (UNH) and WellPoint (WLP) provided enrollment data but not revenue data by sector.  This resulted 
in 15 observations with complete membership information and 14 observations with complete revenue information. 23 
  We begin with the question of whether Scott Brown’s election actually reduced the 
likelihood of Health Reform being enacted.  While this seems likely, it is by no means obvious. 
As the same time that Scott Brown’s election was taking place, pundits and policymakers were 
discussing how Health Reform might be passed even if Scott Brown won the election.  These 
mechanisms included both the budget reconciliation process and the House passing the Senate’s 
version of the bill.
41  Thus, while losing the 60
th Senator reduced the likelihood of Health Reform 
passing, increasing knowledge of alternative roads to passage would increase the perceived 
likelihood of Health Reform passing.    Depending on the relative strength of these two forces it 
is possible, at least in principle, that Brown’s election coincided with an increase in the market’s 
perceived likelihood of Health Reform.  In this case, the interpretation that the positive abnormal 
return to health insurers implies that markets believed Health Reform to be harmful to their 
interests would be reversed.  That is, if Brown’s election made Health Reform more likely and 
benefitted health insurance stocks, then Health Reform would actually be good for insurers. 
  Because the issue of whether Health Reform is good or bad for the healthcare sector and 
for health insurers and pharmaceutical companies in particular is the central question of the 
paper, the sign of these effects cannot be used to shed light on the question of whether Brown’s 
election increased or decreased the likelihood of reform.  However, the history of Health Reform 
and news reports in the days before and after the election suggest that Brown’s election did, in 
fact, decrease the likelihood of reform.  In addition, as noted above there are several provisions 
of the Health Reform bills that suggest unambiguous effects on parts of the healthcare sector, and 
examining the sign of these effects supports our assumption that Brown’s election reduced the 
market’s perceived likelihood of reform passing. 
  The possibility that Brown’s election increased the market’s perception of Health 
Reform’s passage hinges on the proposition that the election coincided with an increase in 
awareness of the alternative methods of passing the bill – use of the budget reconciliation 
process and having the House pass the Senate’s version of the bill – that would not require 60 
votes in the Senate.  However, news reports show that both Democrats and Republicans were 
publicly discussing the potential role of the budget reconciliation process in passing health 
                                                 
41 Ultimately, Health Reform passed using a combination of these methods, with the House first passing the Senate 
Bill and then both houses passing a reconciliation bill that implemented compromises on several of the provisions in 
the original Senate bill. 24 
reform as far back as March, 2009.
42   There is less discussion in the press of the possibility of 
the House passing the Senate version of the bill.  However, unlike the reconciliation process, the 
possibility that the House could pass the Senate bill without requiring another vote relies on a 
straightforward understanding of the Constitution rather than obscure parliamentary procedures.  
Thus, it seems likely that the idea that reconciliation and/or the House passing the Senate’s 
version of the bill could be used in the event of a Brown loss was already well understood by the 
time of the election.  Consequently, the election itself probably did not provide new information 
on this point, especially to industry analysts and others most interested in the healthcare sector. 
  News stories immediately after the election show an awareness of the existence of these 
other roads to passing Health Reform and support the view that Brown’s election reduced the 
likelihood of Health Reform’s passage.  According to the Washington Post on the day after the 
election: 
Unless Democrats can thread a very narrow legislative needle, Republican 
Scott Brown's upset victory over Martha Coakley in Massachusetts on 
Tuesday could lead to the collapse of a health-care bill that, only weeks ago, 
appeared close to becoming law. … The Democratic leaders reconvened 
briefly after Coakley conceded, and with Brown's win, lawmakers said, they 




The article went on to note the possibilities of the House passing the Senate bill and/or using the 
reconciliation procedure. The New York Times ran a similar story, noting that “Scott Brown's 
decisive Senate victory in Massachusetts imperiled the fate of the Democratic health care 
overhaul in Tuesday as House Democrats indicated they would not quickly approve a Senate-
passed health care measure and send it to President Obama.”
44  Thus, news reports from 
immediately after the election support the idea that Brown’s election reduced the likelihood of 
Health Reform passing and that alternate means of passing the legislation, while known, were 
not yet being discussed as likely to be implemented. 
  A second approach to the question of whether Brown’s election increased or decreased 
the likelihood of passing Health Reform relies on the fact that while the impact of the bill on 
some sub-sectors, in particular on health insurers and pharmaceutical companies, was 
                                                 
42 See http://in.reuters.com/article/2009/03/14/usa-congress-healthcare-idINN1338614720090314 and 
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/editorials/articles/2009/03/15/next_stop_health_reform/. 
43 “For health-care reform, picture gets much more complicated,” The Washington Post, January 20, 2010, p. A01. 
44 “Democrats Won’t Rush To Pass Senate Bill,” The New York Times, January 20, 2010, p. A13. 25 
ambiguous, its impact on other sub-sectors was not.  As discussed above, if Brown’s election 
decreased the likelihood of Health Reform passing, we expect Brown’s election to have a 
negative impact on the Facilities (hospitals) subsector and a positive effect on the Equipment 
(devices) subsector. The results in Table 1 confirm these expectations.
 45   Similarly, if Brown’s 
election decreased the likelihood of Health Reform passing, we expect that Brown’s election 
would be better for firms with significant Medicare Advantage involvement and worse for firms 
with significant Medicaid involvement.  Tables 3 and 4 confirm these expectations.  Thus, in all 
cases, the results of the analysis for these unambiguous cases supports the view that Brown’s 
election did, indeed, decrease the likelihood of Health Reform’s passage. 
  A next question that arises with respect to the interpretation of our results is whether, as 
we have assumed, the principle impact of Scott Brown’s election was to reduce the likelihood of 
Health Reform being enacted into law, or whether the election also impacted beliefs about the 
nature of the bill that would be enacted.  If the latter were important, this could affect the 
interpretation of our results.  For example, suppose that the election did not affect the likelihood 
of a bill being enacted at all, but rather resulted in markets believing that a much more pro-
business bill would be enacted.  In this case, the positive abnormal returns to health care stocks 
that we observe would result from the change in the nature of the bill.  Consequently, it would 
not tell us anything about whether the parts of the bill that remained unchanged by the election 
(which were by far the majority) were good or bad for healthcare stocks. 
Although this is theoretically plausible, we begin by noting that a general pro-business 
shift in policy would be unable to account for the negative impacts we find on the facilities 
subsector and on firms’ participation in Medicaid Managed Care.
46  More broadly, however, it is 
unlikely that the election caused a major change in perceptions about the nature of the bill that 
would eventually be passed.  While the House passing the Senate’s version of the bill or use of 
the reconciliation process, which allowed only limited changes to be made to the Senate’s bill, 
would result in final legislation that closely resembled the Senate’s proposal, at the time of the 
                                                 
45 Focusing more closely on hospitals, hospital firms in the SPISP (as defined by NAICS-code classification, 
including Community Health Systems, Tenet Healthcare, Universal Health Services, Health Management 
Association, LifePoint Hospitals, and Kindred Healthcare) experienced an average CAR of negative 6.5 percent, 
with individual firms’ CARs ranging between negative 0.5 (Kindred Healthcare, which is primarily operates nursing 
homes rather than acute care hospitals) and negative 9.9 percent (Community Health Systems). 
46 The finding that the election had a negative impact on some subgroups also casts doubt upon another, similar 
criticism, which argues that the positive abnormal return associated with the election was simply due to a reduction 
in uncertainty about future regulation. 26 
election it was already widely expected that the House-Senate compromise would lean heavily 
toward the Senate’s version. 
The reason for this begins with the tenuous nature of the deal in the Senate that resulted 
in a bill that could be passed by a 60 vote majority in the first place.  Throughout the fall, Senate 
Democrats struggled to enlist Republican support for Health Reform, focusing on Senators Susan 
Collins and Olympia Snowe of Maine.  However, these efforts were unsuccessful, and by the 
middle of December 2009 it had become apparent that the bill would have to be passed without 
Republican support.  At the same time, the Senate Democratic leadership had to struggle just to 
secure the support of its 60-member caucus, and in doing so was forced to make major changes 
to the bill.  In particular, in order to gain Independent Joseph Lieberman’s (CT) vote, the 
Democrats were forced to drop the so-called “public option,” an insurance plan that would be 
provided by the government.
47  Because of the fragility of the coalition in the Senate, it was clear 
that any House-Senate compromise bill that would be able to gain 60 votes in the Senate would 
have to look a lot more like the Senate’s bill than the House’s.  For example, while the House 
bill did include a public option, it was clear that no such provision could pass in the Senate.
48  
According to Lieberman, “There is a natural tendency to split the difference between the Senate 
and the House, [but on the health reform bills] splitting the difference means you won’t have 60 
votes in the Senate.”
49  The Christian Science Monitor summarized the point, saying “Given the 
Senate’s tenuous 60-vote coalition in favor of the bill, it’s likely that the House will have to give 
up more in the final agreement than the Senate will.”
50 
Another factor pointing toward a compromise bill that more closely resembled the Senate 
bill than the House’s is that the House’s bill, estimated to cost more than $1 trillion during the 
legislation’s first 10 years, already cost more than the $900 million limit that President Obama 
had set on the cost of Health Reform, while the Senate bill was estimated to cost only $871 
billion.  According to Drew Altman, president of the Kaiser Family Foundation, “The tension is, 




49 “Democrats Face New Challenges in Merging Bills,” The New York Times, Dec. 22, 2009, p. A1. 
50 “Obama takes hands-on role in advancing healthcare reform,” by Peter Grier, The Christian Science Monitor, 
January 6, 2010. 27 
the more you move toward the House bill, the more you have to pay for that.  There isn’t a lot of 
wiggle room financially, and there isn’t a lot of wiggle room politically in any of this.”
51 
Beyond the public option, the bills also differed on several other dimensions, including 
how to raise revenue to pay for coverage expansions, federal funding of abortions, the level of 
subsidies to help poor people purchase insurance and the penalties imposed on people who do 
not.  The major issue on the revenue side was whether the Senate’s “Cadillac tax” on high-cost 
health plans would be included in the final legislation.  Although this tax, by putting pressure on 
employers to reduce the cost of their health insurance offerings, might be expected to affect the 
profitability of insurers and other healthcare firms, the White House strongly supported the tax, 
and by late December it had already become clear that any final legislation was likely to contain 
some version of the Cadillac tax.
52  In the case of abortion, while this was certainly a contentious 
issue, it seems unlikely that changes in expectations about how Health Reform treats federal 
funding of abortions (which was already prohibited in separate legislation) would affect 
healthcare firms’ stock prices.  Finally, while the bills differed on the size of subsidies for low-
income households and penalties for those who did not purchase insurance, both bills contained 
some version of both, and the financial and political considerations discussed above suggest that 
even before the election the expectation was that these provisions would more closely resemble 
the Senate’s proposal than the House’s. 
Overall, while the House bill was somewhat more ambitious in terms of coverage 
expansion than the Senate bill, with the House’s version reducing the projected number of 
uninsured in 2019 by 37 million people and the Senate’s version reducing it by 31 million, both 
versions of Health Reform were expected to reduce the uninsured by over 30 million people.
53  
Thus, while Brown’s election probably moved the expected compromise bill coming from one 
that looked a lot like the Senate bill to almost exactly the Senate’s bill, this change seems small 
relative to the difference between having either of the two bills and having no bill at all.
54  
Nevertheless, we are unable to completely rule out the possibility that some of the abnormal 
                                                 
51 “Senate and House now must find magic pill; In search of compromise to placate liberals without driving off 
conservatives.”  The Washington Post, December 24, 2009,  p. A01. 
52 Ibid. 
53 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/nation/health/compare-health-plans-2009/ 
54 In addition, a number of the provisions where the two bills differ, such as federal funding for abortion services, 
were dimensions that seem unlikely to have a major impact on healthcare equities. 28 
return to healthcare stocks observed during the event period was due to changes in the nature of 
the bill, rather than changes in the likelihood of its passage. 
Next, we turn to the question of whether Scott Brown’s election might have affected 
other policies that also affected healthcare stocks.  While Scott Brown’s election came in the 
middle of the healthcare debate and he had explicitly vowed during the campaign to block the 
legislation, Brown also broke the Democrats’ 60-vote filibuster-proof majority more generally, 
which could be expected to affect other legislation pending before the Senate and move 
legislative outcomes in the near future in a more Republican-friendly direction.  For example, 
other major legislative efforts under discussion at the time included changes in the taxation of 
dividends, labor reform, and financial sector reform.  While our three-factor model controls for 
market-level risk factors, if the healthcare sector systematically differs from the rest of the 
market in terms of its exposure to these other policy changes, then the abnormal return we 
measure in our event study might be attributable to these other policies rather than health care 
reform. 
We begin with the issue of dividend taxation.  At the time of the Brown-Coakley 
election, current law had the Bush-era tax cuts expiring at the end of 2010.  Thus, without 
additional legislation, individual and corporate tax rates would increase starting in 2011.  Among 
these rate increases was an increase in the tax rate on dividends, which was at that time taxed at a 
reduced rate of 15 percent but would be taxed as ordinary income, with a top marginal rate of 
39.6 percent, after the expiration of the tax cuts.  A number of previous studies have documented 
that firms do, in fact, respond to changes in dividend taxation  (Brown, Liang and Weisbenner, 
2007; Chetty and Saez, 2006; Chetty and Saez, 2010).  This raises a reasonable question of 
whether and/or to what extent the observed effect of Scott Brown’s election on healthcare stocks 
was due to perceived changes in the likelihood of dividend taxation rather than changes in the 
likelihood or nature of Health Reform. 
A second policy under discussion at the time of the Brown-Coakley election was labor 
reform.  The “Employee Free Choice Act” (EFCA) was a piece of pro-labor legislation intended 
to make it easier for employees to unionize and provided harsher penalties against employers 
who try to punish workers for union involvement.  Thus we might expect EFCA to have a 
particularly strong effect on firms and industries with low unionization rates.  Among the 
provisions included in early versions of the bill was “card check,” which would make it easier 29 
for employees to unionize by allowing a union to form whenever signatures of more than 50 
percent of eligible employees indicating their support have been secured, without requiring that 
an additional election be held.  Although EFCA had been watered down throughout the fall of 
2009 (including the removal of the card-check provision), it was recognized that Brown’s 
election likely ended the possibility of its passage.  Hence we should also consider whether some 
of the observed effect on healthcare stocks might have been driven by changes in the perceived 
likelihood of labor reform. 
A final major policy initiative under discussion at the time of the Brown-Coakley election 
was financial sector reform.  At the time of the election, the House had already passed the Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection act of 2009, colloquially referred to as the “Dodd-
Frank” bill, and the bill was being actively discussed in the Senate.  This bill imposed additional 
regulations on the financial sector.  Although it did not directly regulate healthcare firms, to the 
extent that firms must interact with the financial sector (e.g., banks) for financing, Dodd-Frank 
might have affected healthcare firms. 
Ultimately, we will address concerns over these alternative policies by attempting to 
control for firms’ exposure to them in our regressions.  However, before doing that it is 
important to note one crucial difference between Health Reform and these other policies, and 
that is that while Scott Brown was explicitly the marginal vote needed to pass health reform, the 
potential for Brown to make a major impact in the other cases was not as clear.  On labor reform, 
while at the start of 2010 there was still some chance of a labor reform bill being passed, the card 
check provision was jettisoned in the fall of 2009 after it became clear that there were not 60 
Senate votes in favor of a bill with card check in it, and serious doubts remained about whether 
there were 60 votes in support of any version of the labor bill.  Hence it is unlikely that Scott 
Brown was the critical swing vote on labor reform, although Brown’s election may have been the 
final nail in the legislation’s coffin.
55  In the case of dividend tax reform, current law, which was 
favored by Democrats, had the dividend tax rate increasing at the end of 2010.  Since Brown 
presumably favored lower dividend tax rates, he represented a 41
st vote on the Republican side of 
the issue, far short of the 60 votes that would be needed to change current law and extend the 
dividend tax cut.  Finally, in the case of the Dodd-Frank financial-sector reform bill, Brown’s 
position was far more moderate, and in the end he was one of three Republican Senators who 
                                                 
55 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/05/business/05labor.html 30 
voted in favor of Dodd-Frank, although he did likely affect the final bill by gaining concessions 
for Massachusetts-based mutual fund companies in exchange for his support. 
We control for exposure to labor reform and dividend tax reform by including 
unionization rates and dividend rates as controls in our event study regressions.  The dividend 
data come from the CRSP database and include, for each firm, its 2009 dividend rate.  Union 
membership data is based on the Current Population Survey as compiled in the Union 
Membership and Coverage Database from the CPS and include 2009 union membership rates for 
each firm based on its classification into one of 263 different CPS Industry Classification 
Codes.
56 
Exposure to financial sector reform is somewhat more complicated, as it is less obvious 
what cross-sectional variables might proxy for exposure to changes in financial-sector 
regulations.  To address this, we re-run the three factor Fama-French model including as a fourth 
factor the return on a portfolio of financial-sector stocks minus the risk free rate of return 
according to equation (5): 
    it ft i i mt ft si t hi t FINi FINt ft it RR R R S M B H M L R R                Eq. (5)
where RFINt is the return on a portfolio of financial-sector stocks.  The resulting coefficient on 
financial sector returns, βFINi, captures the partial correlation between a firm’s return and 
financial sector returns.  We then use the firm-level “financial-sector beta” coefficients as 
independent variables in our regressions aimed at capturing the relationship between the firm’s 
abnormal returns and exposure to the financial sector.
57 
While controlling for the influence of these factors will help address the question of 
whether the impact of Scott Brown’s election on healthcare stocks might have worked through 
channels other than Health Reform, it will obscure any effects of Health Reform that are 
correlated with the new control variables.  For example, Health Reform included the “Cadillac 
tax” on high-cost health plans, and such plans are often found in the benefit packages for union 
employees.  Thus, even if the entire impact of the election worked through changes in the 
likelihood of Health Reform, we would expect that some of the effect would be correlated at the 
firm (or sector) level with unionization rates.  While we will not be able to separately identify 
                                                 
56 The dataset is compiled by Barry Hirsh and David Macpherson and available at www.unionstats.com. 
57 Alternatively, we used the version of the Fama-French model including the performance of the financial-sector 
portfolio as a fourth factor to predict firms’ abnormal returns net of exposure to the financial sector.  Doing so has 
very little impact on the overall results. 31 
effects that work through changes in the likelihood of labor reform and changes that work 
through changes in the likelihood of health reform but are correlated with unionization, to the 
extent that our results are robust to including unionization and other controls we can conclude 
that the effect of the election was not solely due to changes in the likelihood of labor reform or 
other policies. 
Tables 5 and 5a replicate the analysis in Tables 1 and 1a adding controls for the firm’s 
2009 dividend payout rate, (sector-level) unionization rate, and exposure to the financial sector 
as measured by the firm’s “financial beta.” Results are similar when we also include the square 
of each of these control variables.  Due to the fact that βFINi  might be expected to behave 
differently for financial-sector firms, we exclude them from the regressions.  The results for the 
impact of the election on healthcare stocks do not change substantially if they are included, 
although the coefficients on βFINi do change. 
Tables 5 and 5a show that the main coefficients of interest change only slightly.  We now 
find a 1.84 percent CAR to dollars invested in the healthcare sector, compared to 2.15 in the 
regressions without these controls.  The returns to dollars invested in Managed Care, Equipment, 
Facilities and Pharmaceuticals remain statistically significant, with the magnitudes decreasing 
slightly.   
Taking a closer look at the new controls, we find that unionization is significantly and 
negatively related to firms’ CARs during the event window.  As discussed above, this could be 
due to Brown’s election leading the market to believe that labor reform was less likely to pass.  
Since one of the aims of labor reform was to make it easier for firms to unionize, we would 
expect the benefit of this to be felt most strongly by firms in industries with low unionization 
rates.  Overall, healthcare firms had a mean unionization rate of 3.9 percent, slightly less than the 
overall rate of 6.7 percent, although as one might expect the hospital sector had a higher 
unionization rate of 8.8 percent.  Thus, roughly speaking, the healthcare sector’s lower 
unionization rate accounts for less than one tenth of one percentage point of the observed 
abnormal return to healthcare stocks compared to the market overall. 
The coefficient on firms’ lagged dividend rate is insignificant in all specifications. 
The coefficient on financial-betas are positive and significant in most specifications.   
However, the qualitative impact of financial-sector dependence is small, once again accounting 32 
for less than one tenth of one percentage point of the difference between returns to healthcare 
stocks and returns to the market overall. 
 
 
VII.  Conclusion 
This paper demonstrates a strong link between Scott Brown’s victory and positive 
abnormal returns for firms in the healthcare sector, and in the health insurance and 
pharmaceutical sub-sectors in particular.  Given that Brown campaigned explicitly to defeat 
Health Reform and by virtue of being the 41
st Republican vote had the power to do so, we have 
interpreted the evidence as saying that markets expected the reform effort to be harmful to 
healthcare firms overall and to insurers, pharmaceutical firms and medical device manufacturers 
in particular, but beneficial to hospitals. 
While this interpretation is natural, Scott Brown’s election did more to the Congressional 
landscape than merely defeat health reform.  Thus, it raises the possibility that the abnormal 
returns we detected were not a result of Brown’s opposition to health reform, but to some other 
contemporaneous change.  However, our robustness checks are able to rule out changes in other 
policies such as labor reform, dividend tax policy, or financial sector reform as playing a major 
role in the abnormal returns we observed. 
A more subtle version of this critique is to note that not only did Brown’s election deal a 
severe blow to Health Reform, it also might have signaled that additional regulations aimed at 
the health care sector would become less likely in the future.  Since the health sector is regulated 
more intensively than typical industries, this could result in an abnormal, positive return to health 
care stocks.  Thus the abnormal returns we detected using the event study would contain the 
effects of provisions explicitly in Health Reform as well as other healthcare sector reforms that 
might be coming further down the line.  Although our analysis is unable to separately identify 
these effects, it seems unlikely that the Health Reform was believed to be a good thing for 
insurers but the effect on anticipated future regulations was so strong as to overwhelm this effect 
and generate a positive abnormal return following Brown’s election.  Further, if we interpret the 
Health Reform as containing not only the original legislation but also the additional regulations 
that would follow from it in the future, then both of these types of effects would be included in 
the broader definition of Health Reform. 33 
Rather than test a hypothesis about the impact of an election or policy change on equities, 
this paper uses the efficiency of markets and the impact of Brown’s surprise victory to judge 
which of the competing claims regarding the impact of health reform on the insurance industry, 
and on the health care industry more broadly, is supported by the market.  If markets efficiently 
incorporate information on expectations about future performance, the results suggest that the 
markets side with Republicans, and that Health Reform was expected to harm the insurance 
industry.  However, it should be pointed out that the positive abnormal returns associated with 
Brown’s election do not necessarily invalidate the claims from the left that the bills were too 
generous to insurance companies, since it is likely that the two sides were referring to different 
counterfactuals in their statements.  In particular, many liberal activists believe strongly that the 
right health care system is a single payer system such as the Canadian system or else a 
“Medicare-for-all” type system.  Relative to this benchmark, the current bills were certainly 
more generous to insurance companies than a single-payer system was likely to be.  Thus, while 
the expected defeat of health reform may have been good for insurers relative to the market’s 
expectations before Brown’s election, health reform might still have been better for insurers than 
liberals might have wanted. 
A related issue arises in the interpretation of our finding that Health Reform was expected 
to harm pharmaceutical firms.  During the summer of 2009, the country’s major pharmaceutical 
firms entered into a much-publicized agreement whereby they would support Health Reform and 
contribute $80 billion over a decade to reduce the cost of prescription drugs for senior citizens, 
particularly for those in the Medicare Part D “doughnut hole” between $2,000 and $6,154 per 
year who are expected to pay the full cost of their drugs.  Thus it might appear from our results 
showing that Health Reform harmed drug companies that drug companies made a bad deal.  
However, this interpretation is complicated by the changing landscape of health reform.  At the 
time the drug companies entered into the deal, they were faced with the threat of even stronger 
action and the possibility, for example, that Medicare would take a direct role in negotiating drug 
prices.  Relative to that, the drug companies’ decision to strike a deal made sense.  On the other 
hand, by the time of the Brown election it was clear that if Health Reform failed, it was unlikely 
to be replaced by another significant piece of legislation in the near future.  Thus, following 
Brown’s election, drug companies and their owners were expecting to get out of paying $80 
billion over the next decade and return to a world without significant additional regulation.  Seen 34 
in this light, it is not surprising that we observe pharmaceutical firms benefitting from Brown’s 
election. 
While we have focused on using equity markets to shed light on whether Health Reform 
was expected to benefit or harm the healthcare sector, this study also contributes to the literature 
on the link between political events and stock market returns.  We find that not only did stock 
markets react to Brown’s election, but they did so in a rather nuanced way, with the impact 
varying by subsector (e.g., facilities vs. equipment) and by involvement in particular government 
programs (e.g., Medicare Advantage vs. Medicaid Managed Care).  Thus the findings of this 
paper extend the existing literature on the connection between political events and equity 
markets by showing that markets are able to differentiate among firms even within a particular 
sector (e.g., healthcare) and even among individual insurance firms that differ in their exposure 
to government programs. 
  Although we detected a significant, positive effect on health care stocks following 
Brown’s election, within days this effect had eroded somewhat.  This rebound likely due to 
several factors.  First, in the days immediately after the election it became apparent that Brown’s 
election would not end Democrats’ efforts to pass Health Reform, which may have led markets 
to incorporate an increased belief in the likelihood of its passage.  During a Town Meeting event 
in Ohio on January 22, President Obama declared “I'm going to keep up the fight for real, 
meaningful health insurance reforms. That's why we expanded the children's health insurance 
program to include four million more kids. And that's why I'll continue fighting for reform that 
will hold the insurance industry accountable and bring more stability and security to folks in our 
health care system.”
58  At the same time, although in the immediate aftermath of the election 
Democratic leaders publicly discounted the possibility of passing Health Reform by having the 
House pass the Senate bill or using the reconciliation process, within a few days they began to 
seriously consider these approaches.
59 
  Although the short-term gains in health care stocks did not persist, the losses, coming as 
responses to additional information being integrated into markets in the days following the 
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59 In addition, in the days that followed the election, markets may have come to adjust their beliefs about the degree 
of regulatory uncertainty in the health sector.  According to one analyst, “I think [the drop in stock prices is] because 
the market doesn't like uncertainty. Given the Massachusetts election, the market doesn't know what to do.” (see 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/story/print?guid=06A8328B-57CD-4026-B2CE-EE8547CF35AA)  Finally, 
there was negative information about the industry coming out that was unrelated to the election, with Oppenheimer 
cutting CIGNA from “overperform” to “perform” on January 26, 2010. 35 
election, are fully consistent with our results.  While Brown’s election signaled a decrease in the 
likelihood of Health Reform passing and led to positive abnormal returns, Obama’s speech and 
the Democrats new strategies both increased its likelihood and, consistent with our findings, led 
to losses. 
  Finally, it is important to note that the focus of this paper has been on equity-price 
responses to changes in the likelihood of Health Reform.  To the extent that changes in equity-
prices capture changes in producer surplus, the analysis in this paper provides an early view of 
part of the impact of Health Reform on overall welfare.
60  Although Health Reform may be 
expected to reduce producer surplus, it has the potential to increase consumer welfare through 
expanding coverage, increasing quality and lowering cost in the long run.  However, since the 
provisions of the bill will only be phased in over the next several years, it may be a decade or 
more before this impact can be measured and an overall welfare assessment can be developed.  
Nevertheless, our findings of significant but moderate effects of Health Reform on the healthcare 
industry suggest that overall expectations of Health Reform are that it is not bring about 
catastrophic consequences such as ending private insurance, driving hospitals out of business or 
crushing pharmaceutical innovation. 
 
  
                                                 
60 However, it must also be recognized that publicly-traded firms are only a part of the overall industry.  A full 
welfare analysis would also need to take into account other for-profit firms, non-profit firms, and government 
providers. 36 
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Figure 1:  Intrade.com daily closing prices for the “Brown Victory” and “Coakley 


















Figure 2: Cumulative abnormal return (equally weighted) by event day for All Healthcare Firms, 






Figure 3:  Cumulative abnormal return (equally weighted) by event day for firms in the SPISP 










































Figure 4:  Cumulative abnormal return (weighted by market capitalization) by event day for All 





Figure 5:  Cumulative abnormal return (weighted by market capitalization) by event day for 
firms in the SPISP Equipment, Facilities, Managed Care and Pharmaceuticals subsectors.  







































Figure 6:  Cumulative abnormal return by event day for major managed care firms Aetna (AET), 
Humana (HUM), Cigna (CI), Wellpoint (WLP), United Healthcare (UNH) and Coventry (CVH).  
























Table 1:  Main Results 
 
  Equally Weighted Regressions  Value Weighted Regressions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES CAR  CAR  CAR CAR CAR CAR 
        
Healthcare  0.0057*     0.0215***    
  (0.0031)    (0.0041)    
Healthcare,  SPISP   0.0133***    0.0238***  
   (0.0041)    (0.0044)  
Healthcare,  not  SPISP   0.0035    0.0051  























Managed  Care    0.0285**     0.0632*** 
     (0.0127)     (0.0065) 
Pharmaceuticals     0.0118     0.0292*** 
     (0.0095)     (0.0079) 
Facilities     -0.0033     -0.0337*** 
     (0.0091)     (0.0121) 
Equipment     0.0163***    0.0188*** 
     (0.0058)     (0.0036) 
Distributors     0.0057     0.0129* 
     (0.0096)     (0.0066) 
Supplies     0.0084     0.0077** 
     (0.0076)     (0.0035) 
Services     0.0090    0.0033 
     (0.0070)     (0.0053) 
Technology     0.0227    -0.0057 
     (0.0240)     (0.0045) 
Biotechnology     -0.0080     0.0159*** 
     (0.0061)     (0.0040) 
Life Sci. Tools & Serv.      0.0058      -0.0133 
     (0.0109)     (0.0099) 
Financial Sector  0.0285*** 0.0285*** 0.0285*** 0.0122*** 0.0122*** 0.0122*** 
  (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035) 
Constant  -0.0023* -0.0023* -0.0023*  -0.0048***  -0.0048***  -0.0048*** 
  (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
        
Observations  3,674 3,674 3,674 3,674 3,674 3,674 
R-squared  0.0204 0.0208 0.0228 0.0817 0.0881 0.1327 
Note: Columns 1 – 3 each report estimates from equally weighted OLS regressions of the firms’ CARs on the variables listed in the rows. Columns 4 – 6 each 
report estimates from OLS regressions weighted by the firms’ market capitalization.  Healthcare is an indicator variable for firms classified in two-digit GICS 
code 35, “Healthcare”.  Healthcare SPISP and Healthcare non-SPISP are indicator variables that further divide firms in to whether or not they are constituents of 
one of four S&P Industry Select Portfolios (Health Care Equipment, Health Care Services, Pharmaceuticals, or Biotechnology).  The variables labeled 
“Healthcare Subsectors” further divide all healthcare firms into subsectors based on seven digit GICS codes.  Financial Sector is an indicator variable for whether 
the firm is in the financial sector.  Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 42 
Table 1a:  Main Results (continued) 
 
   (1)  (2) 
    Equally Weighted  Value Weighted 







    
Managed Care  0.0701***  0.0693*** 
 (0.0064)  (0.0061) 
Pharmaceuticals 0.0330*** 0.0300*** 
 (0.0077)  (0.0082) 
Facilities -0.0313**  -0.0451*** 
 (0.0151)  (0.0152) 
Equipment 0.0192***  0.0162*** 
 (0.0045)  (0.0034) 
Distributors 0.0071  0.0141** 
 (0.0070)  (0.0072) 
Supplies 0.0097**  0.0091** 
 (0.0045)  (0.0037) 
Services 0.0045  0.0014 
 (0.0173)  (0.0055) 
Biotechnology 0.0050  0.0168*** 
 (0.0080)  (0.0042) 
Life Sci. Tools & Serv.  -0.0053  0.0031 











Managed Care  0.0058  0.0075 
 (0.0155)  (0.0168) 
Pharmaceuticals  0.0017 -0.0011 
 (0.0133)  (0.0133) 
Facilities 0.0089  -0.0059 
 (0.0102)  (0.0084) 
Equipment 0.0155**  0.0309*** 
 (0.0072)  (0.0048) 
Distributors 0.0048  0.0018 
 (0.0149)  (0.0068) 
Supplies 0.0079  0.0021 
 (0.0105)  (0.0089) 
Services 0.0108  0.0199*** 
 (0.0070)  (0.0071) 
Technology 0.0227  -0.0057 
 (0.0240)  (0.0045) 
Biotechnology -0.0106  0.0102 
 (0.0071)  (0.0092) 
Life Sci. Tools & Serv.  0.0069  -0.0270*** 
 (0.0120)  (0.0097) 
 Financial  Sector  0.0285***  0.0122*** 
   (0.0047)  (0.0035) 
 Constant  -0.0023*  -0.0048*** 
   (0.0012)  (0.0013) 
      
 Observations  3,674  3,674 
 R-squared  0.0248  0.1428 
Note: Columns 1 reports estimates from equally weighted OLS regressions of the firms’ CARs on the variables listed in the 
rows. Columns 2 reports estimates from OLS regressions weighted by the firms’ market capitalization.  The variables labeled 
“SPISP” are indicator variables that divide all healthcare firms into subsectors based on seven digit GICS codes and whether 
they are in one of four S&P Industry Select Portfolios (Health Care Equipment, Health Care Services, Pharmaceuticals, or 
Biotechnology).  The variables labeled Non-SPISP are indicator variables that divide firms based on subsector for firms that 
are not in one of the SPISP portfolios. Financial Sector is an indicator variable for whether the firm is in the financial sector.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2:  Individual Managed-Care Firms 
 
Firm CAR  p-value 
Aetna 0.0645  0.021 
Cigna 0.0558  0.028 
Coventry Health  0.0693  0.018 
Humana 0.0972  0.005 
United Healthcare  0.0718  0.017 
Wellpoint 0.0481  0.041 
Note: This table gives the CAR over the event window for each of 
the six Managed Care firms that are also in one of the S&P Industry 
Select healthcare portfolios.  The p-value is the probability that a 
CAR drawn from the distribution of CARs for all non-healthcare, 
non-financial, S&P 500 firms is greater than or equal to the firm’s 
CAR. 
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Table 3:  Impact of Government Programs 
 
    
 (1)  (2) 
VARIABLES CAR  CAR 
    
Medicare Advantage  0.0505***  0.0587*** 
 (0.00836)  (0.0129) 
Medicaid Managed Care  -0.0664**  -0.0532 
 (0.0299)  (0.0351) 
Medicaid   -0.0160 
   (0.0198) 
Financial Sector  0.0276***  0.0275*** 
 (0.00467)  (0.00467) 
Constant -0.00133  -0.00129 
 (0.00110)  (0.00110) 
    
Observations 3,664  3,664 
R-squared 0.021  0.021 
Note: Columns 1 and 2 report estimates for equally weighted 
regressions of the firms’ CAR on the variables listed in the rows.  
“Medicare Advantage,” “Medicare” and “Medicare Managed Care” 
are indicator variables for whether the firm description on google 
finance contains each of these terms.  Financial Sector is an 
indicator for whether the firm is in the financial sector.  Robust 
standard errors in parentheses.  For column 2, the test of H0: 
Medicaid Managed Care + Medicaid = 0; F(1,3669) = 4.84, Prob > 
F = 0.0279; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  45 
 
Table 4: Impact of Government Program Membership and Revenue 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
VARIABLES CAR CAR CAR CAR 
      
MA Members  5.27e-05***  5.34e-05**     
 (1.39e-05)  (1.71e-05)     
Medicaid Members  -5.04e-05***  -5.08e-05***     
 (1.21e-05)  (1.43e-05)     
Comm. Members  3.25e-06**  3.37e-06**     
 (1.26e-06)  (1.47e-06)     
MA Revenue      4.60e-06***  4.13e-06** 
     (1.18e-06)  (1.33e-06) 
Medicaid Revenue      -2.28e-05***  -2.26e-05*** 
     (5.62e-06)  (6.07e-06) 
Comm. Revenue      8.39e-07  2.56e-07 
     (6.13e-07)  (7.98e-07) 
SPISP   -2.396e-03    1.280e-02 
   (0.0231)  (0.0164) 
Constant 4.323e-02***  4.381e-02*** 4.287e-02***  4.245e-02** 
  (0.00911)  (0.0114) (0.0123) (0.0133) 
      
Observations  15 15 14 14 
R-squared  0.725 0.725 0.766 0.770 
Note: Columns 1 and 2 report the results of regressions of each firm’s CAR on the number of members in its Medicare 
Advantage (MA), Medicaid, and Commercial segments (measured in thousands).  SPIS is an indicator variable for 
whether the firm is in one of the S&P Industry Select Portfolios.  Columns 3 and 4 report the results of regressions of each 
firm’s CAR on the revenue earned in its Medicare Advantage (MA), Medicaid, and Commercial segments (measured in 
millions of dollars). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5:  Robustness 
  Equally Weighted Regressions Value  Weighted  Regressions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES  CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR 
        
Healthcare  0.00400     0.0184***    
  (0.00325)    (0.00397)    
Healthcare,  SPISP   0.0112***    0.0206***  
   (0.00419)    (0.00433)  
Healthcare, not SPISP    0.00195      0.00344   























Managed  Care     0.0255**     0.0609*** 
     (0.0128)     (0.00627) 
Pharmaceuticals    0.00964     0.0252*** 
     (0.00956)    (0.00777) 
Facilities     -0.00447     -0.0332*** 
     (0.00900)     (0.0118) 
Equipment     0.0148**     0.0167*** 
     (0.00579)    (0.00384) 
Distributors     0.00487     0.00640 
     (0.00990)    (0.00469) 
Supplies     0.00634     0.00554 
     (0.00778)    (0.00356) 
Services     0.00792     0.00191 
     (0.00707)    (0.00556) 
Technology     0.0209     -0.00823* 
     (0.0242)     (0.00462) 
Biotechnology     -0.00990     0.0140*** 
     (0.00618)    (0.00417) 
Life Sci. Tools & Serv.      0.00410      -0.0145 
     (0.0109)     (0.0101) 
Dividend  -0.00399 -0.00570 -0.00857  0.0760  0.0661  0.0610 
  (0.0466) (0.0460) (0.0453) (0.0500) (0.0487) (0.0482) 
Unionization  -0.000159* -0.000159* -0.000158*  -0.000273***  -0.000268***  -0.000261** 
  (9.55e-05) (9.54e-05) (9.55e-05) (0.000102)  (0.000102)  (0.000102) 
Financial  Beta  0.675** 0.658** 0.670**  0.491*  0.480*  0.416 
  (0.270) (0.270) (0.270) (0.262) (0.262) (0.261) 
Constant  -9.11e-05 -8.36e-05 -5.48e-05 -0.00274  -0.00260  -0.00266 
  (0.00172) (0.00172) (0.00173) (0.00174) (0.00173) (0.00173) 
        
Observations  2,845 2,845 2,845 2,845 2,845 2,845 
R-squared  0.005 0.005 0.011 0.102 0.108 0.160 
Note: Columns 1 – 3 each report estimates from equally weighted OLS regressions of the firms’ CARs on the variables listed in the rows. Columns 4 – 6 each report estimates from OLS regressions weighted by the firms’ 
market capitalization.  Healthcare is an indicator variable for firms classified in two-digit GICS code 35, “Healthcare”.  Healthcare SPISP and Healthcare non-SPISP are indicator variables that further divide firms in to 
whether or not they are constituents of one of four S&P Industry Select Portfolios (Health Care Equipment, Health Care Services, Pharmaceuticals, or Biotechnology).  The variables labeled “Healthcare Subsectors” further 
divide all healthcare firms into subsectors based on seven digit GICS codes.  Dividend is the firm’s 2009 dividend rate, Unionization is the 2009 proportion of the firm’s workers who are union members (measures on a scale 
form 0 – 100), Financial Beta is the partial correlation between the firm’s return and that of a portfolio of financial sector stocks.  Financial Sector firms are not included in the regressions.  Robust standard errors in 
parentheses.     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 47 
Table 5a:  Robustness 
   (1)  (2) 
    Equal Weighted  Value Weighted 







    
Managed Care  0.0666***  0.0669*** 
 (0.0064)  (0.0057) 
Pharmaceuticals 0.0310***  0.0260*** 
 (0.0078)  (0.0080) 
Facilities -0.0317**  -0.0441*** 
 (0.0147)  (0.0149) 
Equipment 0.0172***  0.0140*** 
 (0.0045)  (0.0036) 
Distributors 0.0060  0.0073 
 (0.0080)  (0.0051) 
Supplies 0.0069  0.0068* 
 (0.0046)  (0.0037) 
Services 0.0022  -0.0001 
 (0.0175)  (0.0057) 
Biotechnology 0.0020  0.0148*** 
 (0.0081)  (0.0044) 
Life Sci. Tools & Serv.  -0.0056  0.0024 







Managed Care  0.0032  0.0053 
 (0.0156)  (0.0167) 
Pharmaceuticals -0.0005  -0.0020 
 (0.0133)  (0.0129) 
Facilities 0.0074  -0.0073 
 (0.0102)  (0.0085) 
Equipment 0.0142*  0.0294*** 
 (0.0072)  (0.0049) 
Distributors 0.0043  -0.0002 
 (0.0152)  (0.0070) 
Supplies 0.0062  0.0001 
 (0.0107)  (0.0089) 
Services 0.0101  0.0189*** 
 (0.0070)  (0.0072) 
Technology 0.0210  -0.0083* 
 (0.0242)  (0.0046) 
Biotechnology -0.0122*  0.0086 
 (0.0072)  (0.0092) 
Life Sci. Tools & Serv.  0.0051  -0.0286*** 
 (0.0120)  (0.0097) 
 Dividend  -0.0117  0.0577 
   (0.0443)  (0.0484) 
 Unionization  -0.0002  -0.0003** 
   (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
 Financial  Beta  0.6520**  0.4165 
   (0.2702)  (0.2613) 
 Constant  -0.0001  -0.0026 
   (0.0017)  (0.0017) 
      
 Observations  2,845  2,845 
 R-squared  0.0154  0.1718 
Note: Columns 1 reports estimates from equally weighted OLS regressions of the firms’ CARs on the variables listed in the rows. Columns 2 reports 
estimates from OLS regressions weighted by the firms’ market capitalization.  The variables labeled “SPISP” are indicator variables that divide all 
healthcare firms into subsectors based on seven digit GICS codes and whether they are in one of four S&P Industry Select Portfolios (Health Care 
Equipment, Health Care Services, Pharmaceuticals, or Biotechnology).  The variables labeled Non-SPISP are indicator variables that divide firms 
based on subsector for firms that are not in one of the SPISP portfolios. Dividend is the firm’s 2009 dividend rate, Unionization is the 2009 
proportion of the firm’s workers who are union members (measures on a scale from 0 – 100), Financial Beta is the partial correlation between the 
firm’s return and that of a portfolio of financial sector stocks.  Financial firms are not included in the regressions.  Robust standard errors in 
parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 